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ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A RATIONAL
APPROACH TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Kris W. Kobach*
For years, the public debate about illegal immigration in the United States
has been gripped by a false dichotomy. We have been told that there are only
two choices in addressing the fact that twelve to twenty million aliens are
unlawfully present in the United States: either attempt to round them up and
remove them all, or grant a massive amnesty and provide all (or virtually all)
illegal aliens I legal status.
Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City) School of Law. A.B.
1988, Harvard
University; M.Phil. 1990, Oxford University; D.Phil. 1992, Oxford University; J.D. 1995, Yale
Law School. During 2001-2003, the author was White House Fellow and Counsel to U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, serving as the Attorney General's chief adviser on immigration
law and border security. The author is also lead counsel representing the municipalities of
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Valley Park, Missouri, and counsel advising the state of Arizona in
the defense of illegal-immigration-related statutes and ordinances.
1. I use the term "illegal alien" because it is a legally accurate term used repeatedly in the
immigration laws of the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1356(r)(3)(ii) (2006) ("expenses
associated with the detention of illegal aliens"); 8 U.S.C. § 1366(l) (2006) ("the number of illegal
aliens incarcerated in Federal and State prisons"). Another phrase that is used throughout the
immigration laws of the United States is "alien not lawfully present in the United States." See,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2006) ("the alien has the burden of establishing... (B) by clear and
convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States"); 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g)(10) (2006) ("for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State...
(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention,
or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States."). This term, however, is a bit too
cumbersome for a writing of this nature. A third term, "unauthorized alien," is found in federal
immigration laws, but is limited to the employment context. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006)
("[m]aking employment of unauthorized aliens unlawful"); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2006) ("other
than an unauthorized alien, as defined in section 1324a(h)(3) of this title"). In contrast, the
ambiguous terms "undocumented immigrant" and "undocumented alien" do not appear anywhere
in the immigration laws of the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1 l01(a)-(i) (2006).
Accordingly, I will use the shorter of the two appropriate terms recognized by federal statute,
namely "illegal alien."
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This is a truly curious assertion. In no other area of law do serious people
suggest that the only options are either pursuing total enforcement in order to
achieve zero violations, or granting amnesty and thereby accommodating
lawbreaking. No one claims that the only options regarding driving under the
influence are mandatory breathalyzer checks at every bar and restaurant prior to
allowing patrons to drive home, versus the elimination of penalties for driving
under the influence. No one claims that the only options in confronting theft are
the imposition of a police state with an officer on every block versus amnesty for
all thieves.
Perhaps the best analogy is that of speeding on a highway. If it is well
known that virtually no one is ever ticketed for speeding on a particular section
of highway, people will predictably speed with impunity. The longer that a
regime of non-enforcement exists, the more brazen and pervasive the speeding
becomes. In an effort to restore the rule of law, no one seriously suggests that
the only two options are ticketing every speeder or abandoning the speed limit
laws entirely. In fact, a third, intermediate option is far superior. Simply posting
a highway patrol officer on that section of highway and ticketing a small
percentage of speeders changes everything. Drivers recognize that the threat of
enforcement is real, and they change their behavior accordingly. The ratcheting
up of enforcement produces a dramatic decline in lawbreaking.
In fact, in every area of law, society relies on the deterrence of lawbreaking
through the credible threat of enforcement.
If lawbreaking reaches an
unacceptably high level, then law enforcement officials increase enforcement
resources and activities in order to change the behavior of the lawbreakers. The
time has come to apply this obvious concept to immigration law on a nationwide
scale. The twelve to twenty million illegal aliens in the United States need not
be rounded up and forcibly removed through direct government action. Illegal
aliens can be encouraged to depart the United States on their own, through a
concerted strategy of attrition through enforcement. Illegal aliens are rational
decision makers. If the risks of detention or involuntary removal go up, and the
probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment goes down, then at
some point, the only rational decision is to return home.
This has never been the immigration strategy of the United States. Instead,
the national immigration policy for the last decade has been one of triageincarcerate alien smugglers and deport aliens involved in violent crimes, but do
virtually nothing to enforce the law against garden-variety illegal aliens. The
vast majority of illegal aliens fall into the third category. Consequently, most
illegal aliens have never faced a serious threat of enforcement, and working
illegally has always been easy.
There is no credible threat of enforcement against most illegal aliens
because the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
only approximately 3,000 interior enforcement agents attempting to cover the
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entire country. 2 Most police departments in large cities have more officers than
ICE does. Due to ICE's inadequate manpower, illegal aliens know that the
probability of actually encountering federal immigration enforcement officers is
very low. In this environment, the rule of law has eroded persistently and
pervasively.
However, it is possible to change the enforcement landscape. What if every
illegal alien found it difficult to obtain employment in the United States and the
risks of enforcement (including the possibility of detention during removal
hearings) were to increase for all? Those new realities would dramatically alter
behavior. Attrition through enforcement would occur. There is empirical
evidence that attrition through enforcement works in immigration. Two case
studies have made this clear: Arizona and the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (NSEERS).
In 2007, Arizona became the first state in America to require all employers
to verify the legal status of employees through the federal government's "EVerify" system.
The new law also made the knowing employment of an
unauthorized alien a violation of state law and subjected offending employers to
the suspension of business licenses. 4 The internet-based E-Verify system places
responsibility on the federal government to offer a conclusive determination as
to whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States. Upon hiring
an individual, the employer simply enters the employee's name, date of birth,
and Social Security number or other work authorization number into the system.
The employer receives an answer back from the federal government in seconds.
Over 20,000 businesses across the country were already using E-Verify
voluntarily before January 1, 2008. Thereafter, Arizona's 145,000 businesses
were obliged to join their ranks. By the end of February 2008, the number of
businesses using the system had already climbed to approximately 55,000.
When employers verify the employment authorization of every new
employee with the federal government it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for
unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs. Unauthorized aliens know that E-Verify
makes it impossible for them to fabricate Social Security numbers and use
counterfeit identity cards to deceive employers. And when the jobs dry up,
unauthorized aliens self-deport.
Arizona's statute had immediate and profound effects. Newspapers in the
state reported in January 2008 that illegal aliens were already self-deporting by

2. Past Present and Future: A Historic and Personal Reflection on American Immigration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int'l
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Michael Cutler,

Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies).
3. E-Verify was formerly called the "Basic Pilot Program."; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §23-214.
4. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(l)(c)-(d) (2007).
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the thousands. 5 Apartment complexes in Phoenix and Tucson confirmed that
thousands of alien tenants had vacated their apartments. 6 The overburdened
Arizona public school system saw its costs drop dramatically with the departure
of illegal alien households; a $48.6 million surplus suddenly appeared in FY
2008. 7 Although some illegal aliens undoubtedly moved to neighboring states,
many returned across the border to Mexico. This was verified by the
neighboring Mexican state of Sonora. In January 2008, Sonora sent a delegation
of nine state legislators to Arizona to criticize the new law. Absurdly, they
complained that Sonora could not handle the burden that the influx of returning
Mexican citizens was imposing on Sonoran schools and housing. 8 Needless to
say, it was difficult to persuade the Arizona legislators that the taxpayers of
Arizona should continue to bear the burden instead.
Federal law enforcement officials noticed the outward migration as well.
At the end of February 2008, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
Chertoff commented publicly on the subject:
Likewise, we're continuing to promote the use of E-Verify. The state of
Arizona... in the last couple days had its new rule requiring E-Verify use
sustained by the federal courts, and we are beginning to see that illegal workers
are picking up and leaving, because they recognize this system is an impediment
9
to their continued illegal activities and illegal employment in this country.
Clearly, the Department of Homeland Security was pleased with what was
happening in Arizona. It was impossible to deny that making E-Verify
participation mandatory had resulted in unprecedented numbers of selfdeportations.
The impact of doing what Arizona has done on a national scale would be
tremendous. Currently, millions of unauthorized aliens fabricate social security

5. See, e.g., Daniel Gonzdlez, Apartments Going Empty as Hiring Law Hits Migrants,

ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2008, at Al; see also Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security,
Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Attorney General Mukasey at a
Briefing on Immigration Enforcement and Border Security Efforts (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with the
Tulsa
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available

at

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1203722713615.shtm.
6. Gonzdlez, supra note 5; see also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of Flight by
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A13.

7. JLBC
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at

2,

available

at

http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/mfh-dec-07.pdf. See also Jacques Billeaud, Employer-Sanctions Law
Forces Illegal Immigrants to Move On, SIERRA VISTA HERALD, March 3, 2008, available at

http://www.svherald.com/articles/2008/03/03/news/doc47cb9f7cl 4db5486886624.txt.
8. Sheryl Kornman, Sonoran Officials Slam Sanctions Law in Tucson Visit, TUCSON CITIZEN,

Jan. 16, 2008, at 4A.
9. Statement of U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Joint Press Conference of Secretary
Michael Chertoff and Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Feb. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1203722713615.shtm.
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numbers and employment authorization numbers to obtain employment in the
United States. Incredibly, each year more than half a million individuals work
illegally in the United States under the Social Security number 000-00-0000.'10
Millions more are somewhat more creative when they fabricated their Social
Security numbers. In 2002, some nine million Social Security records were filed
with invalid or incomplete information. 1 Without any system in place to
confirm that a name, date of birth, and Social Security number all match the
federal government's records, such fraudulent behavior occurs unabated.
However, E-Verify changes the game. When employers are compelled to verify
every new employee's immigration status with the federal government, it
becomes extremely difficult to violate the law.
2
Arizona offers compelling proof that attrition through enforcement works, '
but this is not the only case study that we have. The effectiveness of attrition
through enforcement was first demonstrated in 2002 and 2003, with the
implementation of the NSEERS by the U.S. Department of Justice. In the wake
of the September 11 th attacks on the World Trade Center, the Department of
Justice launched NSEERS to screen and register aliens from Al Qaedaassociated countries and aliens from anywhere in the world whose backgrounds
or travel patterns suggested a higher risk of potential involvement in terrorism
In addition to screening and registering these arriving aliens at ports of
entry, NSEERS also required the registration of aliens from Al Qaeda-associated
countries who were already in the United States. In late 2002 and early 2003,
the Justice Department ordered designated aliens from those countries to report
to INS offices to provide fingerprints and register. ' 3 If they did not register, they

10. Between 1985-2000, approximately nine million annual Social Security records were
submitted with all zeros in the number field, or an average of 600,000 per year. U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: BETTER COORDINATION AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES

COULD REDUCE UNIDENTIFIED EARNINGS REPORTS,

GAO-05-154, 3 (Feb. 2005).

11. Id. at 1.
12. A reasonable argument can be made that Oklahoma's House Bill 1804, which was enacted
in 2007, also demonstrated attrition through enforcement at the state level. Although H.B. 1804
did not require all businesses in the state to use the E-Verify system, it did combine a number of
smaller enforcement-oriented measures in one omnibus bill, including the denial of public benefits
to illegal aliens, the creation of state-level crimes with respect to the transportation and harboring
of illegal aliens, the prohibition of sanctuary cities in Oklahoma, and other measures. See
Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla.
2007) (codified in scattered sections). Some newspapers reported anecdotal evidence that the
legislation had prompted illegal aliens to leave the state of Oklahoma. See, e.g., Emily Bazar,
Strict Immigration Law Rattles Okla. Businesses, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2008, at IA.
13. Anthony

Kujawa, Foreign Visitor Registration Program Called "Great Success,"
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, May 1, 2003, http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2003/May/20030501162441 relhcie0.4553644.html.
AMERICA.GOV,
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faced stiff penalties. Of the countries concerned, Pakistan had the largest
number of its nationals in the Unites States.
As the process moved forward, some 1,500 Pakistanis who had been
unlawfully present in the United States were deported by the federal government.
However, the more salient figure is the number of self-deportations that
occurred. According to the government of Pakistan, approximately 15,000
illegal aliens from Pakistan left the United States on their own. 14 They did so
because they realized that the threat of enforcement through the NSEERS
program was real. Most returned directly to Pakistan. An estimated 3,000
attempted to enter Canada with the hole of benefiting from the Canadian
Regardless, the central fact was
government's permissive asylum rules.
undeniable; the credible threat of enforcement had resulted in mass selfdeportation.
It was stunning proof that attrition through enforcement works. When the
risks of being detained and/or prosecuted go up dramatically, illegal aliens make
the rational decision to leave the United States on their own. The NSEERS
program demonstrated this fact in 2002 and 2003, and Arizona's E-Verify law
demonstrated it in 2008.
If a strategy of attrition through enforcement were implemented nationwide,
it would gradually, but inexorably, reduce the number of illegal aliens in the
United States. Self-deportation is already a reality. There is a great deal of
turnover in the illegal alien population, even under the current, relatively lax
enforcement regime. According to federal government figures from the year
2000, approximately 183,000 illegal aliens self-deport every year. 16 However,
some 900,000 to 1,000,000 illegal aliens enter the country or overstay their visas
annually. 17 If Congress were to take the necessary steps to make attrition
through enforcement a reality, it would become extremely difficult for aliens to
obtain unauthorized employment, and the probability of facing enforcement for
the typical illegal alien would increase substantially. Consequently, many illegal
aliens would make the rational decision to return home on their own volition.

14. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2671
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Judiciary Comm.,

108th Cong. (2003) (statement of James R. Edwards, Adjunct Fellow, Center for Immigration
Studies).
15. Karen Branch-Brioso, U.S. Ends Program Setting Annual Immigrant Reviews: More Than
80,000 Were Expected for Interviews, ST. LOuIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 2003, at A2.

16. The number of self-deportations increased steadily from 1990 to 2000, so it is likely that the
self-deportation figure is much higher now. See OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGRATION
& NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING
10 tbl.C (2003), available at
ING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/IlReport_1211 .pdf.
17. See id.
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Eventually those numbers could be reversed, as the annual number of selfdeportations gradually surpassed the number of incoming illegal aliens. Over
time, the illegal alien population would dwindle to a fraction of its current size.
What would a nationwide strategy of attrition through enforcement entail?
Properly conceived, it would involve several steps: (1) mandating that all
employers in the country use the E-Verify system to verify the work
authorization of new employees, a step that the U.S. House of Representatives
took in December 2005 with the passage of H.R. 443718 (but the Senate never
acted on the bill); (2) increasing the removal rate of aliens who have not been
convicted of serious felonies; (3) increasing the percentage of aliens who are
detained during removal proceedings to reduce the number of absconders; 19 (4)
increasing the number of Section 287(g) agreements between ICE and state law
enforcement agencies;
(5) ending sanctuary cities by denying federal law
enforcement funding to cities that violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b); 2 1 and (6)
18. See H.R. Res. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill was also commonly known as the
"Sensenbrenner Bill," referring to its sponsor, Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner.
19. Increasing the number of detainees would require continuing the current expansion in the
number of detention beds. "Absconders" are those aliens who fail to show up for their removal
hearings or flee upon receipt of a removal order. According to a 2003 report by the Office of the
Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice, the INS deported approximately thirteen
percent of aliens who were not detained prior to their removal proceedings, but the INS deported
approximately ninety-two percent of the aliens who were detained prior to their removal
proceedings.

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION AND

NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS, Rep. No. 1-2003-004, ii

(2003).
20. See Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179, 196-99 (2005).
21. §1373.
Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provisions of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State,
or local government entity from doing any of the following with
respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving
such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
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increasing the number of ICE interior enforcement agents. The most important
of these steps is the first-making E-Verify mandatory for all employers
nationwide. Some combination of the other five steps would also be necessary
in order for most illegal aliens to experience an increased probability of
encountering meaningful law enforcement.
In addition to the fact that it works, attrition through enforcement possesses
a significant advantage over other competing approaches: it is comparatively
inexpensive to implement. It takes considerable government manpower and
other resources to arrest an illegal alien, initiate removal proceedings, detain him
if necessary, provide the hearings and appellate review to which he is entitled,
and ultimately remove him. 22 It is also extremely expensive to implement an
amnesty and pay for the government benefits enjoyed by the newly-legalized
in 2007 would have cost the
aliens. The amnesty considered by the U.S. Senate
23
period.
ten-year
a
over
trillion
$2.6
States
United
In contrast, attrition through enforcement is relatively inexpensive. It costs
the federal government very little when aliens self-deport. All that attrition
through enforcement requires is a realistic probability that enforcement will
occur. The mere probability of enforcement, in and of itself, changes behavior.
Arizona is a case in point. Illegal aliens began pouring out of the state in the
run-up to January 1, 2008, but no county attorney in Arizona had actually
initiated any enforcement action. Indeed, during the course of litigation, the
county attorneys announced that they would not begin enforcement until after
March 1, 2008. No government official had to lift a finger for tens of thousands
to self-deport. One study estimated the cost of implementing a nationwide
attrition-through-enforcement strategy to be approximately $400 million per year

(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal,
State, or local government entity.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b) (2006).
22. In 2005, the Center for American Progress came up with a simplistic and widely-criticized
estimate of what it would cost to apprehend and remove ten million illegal aliens from the United
States, speculating that the figure would be approximately $206 billion to $230 billion over five
years, or at least $41 billion a year. See Darryl Fears, $41 Billion Cost Projected To Remove
Illegal Entrants, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 2005, at Al1. Critics assailed that figure as a gross
overestimate. See Mac Johnson, What Would It Cost to Deport Illegal Aliens?, HUMAN EVENTS,
Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=8387. Regardless of how inflated that

figure is, it is certainly true that the process of removing aliens one at a time through direct
government action requires a substantial commitment of public resources.
23. Robert Rector, Amnesty Will Cost US. Taxpayers at Least $2.6 Trillion, THE HERITAGE

FOUNDATION, June 6, 2007, at 1, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/wm1490.cfm.
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over a five-year period--or less24 than one percent of the budget of the
Department of Homeland Security.
The time has come to make attrition through enforcement the nationwide
strategy of the federal government. Attrition through enforcement promises to
transform the landscape of illegal immigration. It has already succeeded at the
state level and, within the confines of the NSEERS program, at the national
level. If implemented nationwide, it would do much to restore the rule of law in
immigration and gradually reduce the number of illegal aliens in the United
States. The alternative-continuing to focus on the false dichotomy of massive
government round-ups versus amnesty-will only ensure policy paralysis in
Washington.

24. Jessica M. Vaughan, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink
the Illegal Population, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIEs BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back406.pdf (discussing several components in the
attrition-through-enforcement model: mandatory E-Verify, data sharing between the Social
Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security, increased ICE cooperation
with state and local law enforcement, expansion of the US-VISIT program, increased removals,
and the continuing proliferation of state and local laws discouraging illegal immigration; see also
Rector, supra note 21, at 5.

